"If He Wins, I'm Moving to Canada": Ideological Migration Threats Following the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election

Matt Motyl*

University of Virginia

Every four years, partisan Americans threaten to migrate to Canada (or some other country) if their preferred candidate loses the Presidential election. This phenomenon has yet to undergo an empirical test. In the present experiment, 308 Obama voters and 142 Romney voters following the 2012 election responded to one of two writing prompts that led them to think about how the United States was becoming more liberal or conservative. Regardless of the writing prompt condition, Romney voters endorsed migration expressions more than Obama voters. Furthermore, Romney voters, compared to Obama voters, expressed a reduced sense of belonging in the United States. The relationship between voting for Romney and migration expressions was fully mediated by sense of belonging. Together, these findings support the ideological migration hypothesis and suggest that threatening to move to Canada following an undesirable election outcome may be driven by voters' belonging needs.

Why do partisans threaten to move to Canada if their preferred candidate loses the Presidential election? Perhaps it is because losing hurts. And losing hurts more when you care about the outcome. Every four years roughly half of the American electorate votes for a losing candidate in an election that matters deeply to many. In an age with constant media coverage, these voters are frequently reminded that most Americans rejected their values in the voting booth. This sense of rejection may undermine their fundamental need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and lead people to try satisfying their belonging needs in a place that might better share their values. In the present article, I report results from one study testing this

———————

*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Matt Motyl, Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, P.O. Box 400400, Charlottesville, VA 22904 [e-mail: motyl@virginia.edu]

hypothesis and provide evidence that people who voted for the losing candidate in the 2012 Presidential election threaten to migrate and report a reduced sense of belonging relative to people who voted for the winning candidate.

Belonging

People have a fundamental need to belong and to feel that they are a valued member of social groups (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary 2009). In navigating their social environments, people use various cues to determine who might be likely to accept or reject them. For example, dark-skinned Black students attending majority White schools reported feeling that they do not belong at their institutions (Oyserman, Brickman, Bybee, & Celious, 2006; Walton & Cohen, 2011). Similarly, women participating in math, science, and engineering class video conferences reported a reduced sense of belonging when the camera recording of the class focused on disproportionately more men than women (Murphy, Steele, & Gross, 2007). In each of these cases, participants viewed environments inhabited by people who were similar or dissimilar on some visible demographic characteristic (e.g., race). If the environments were inhabited by others who appeared similar to the participants, participants reported an elevated sense of belonging. This expectation that one will fit in with similar others is one of the forces that drives attraction to similar others (Byrne, 1971; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). People also seem to expect that they will not fit in with people who are different and this expectation seems to repel them from pursuing relationships with dissimilar others (Rosenbaum, 1986).

Ideological and moral similarity are especially important in selecting social interaction partners and finding a niche where one can successfully satisfy their belonging needs (Haidt, Hom, & Rosenberg, 2003). Ideological similarity, though, is harder to detect when simply evaluating visible, physical characteristics of people in a given social environment. Thus, people might infer ideological value similarity from these visible physical cues. Indeed, people evaluate others who exhibited physical cues of a group that tends to have similar ideological values as more likeable and favorable (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013). Specifically, African Americans tend to align with the more liberal Democratic Party, and this perception of ideological similarity for liberal participants predicted increased liking, and this perception of ideological *dis*similarity for conservative participants predicted decreased liking. Importantly, though, when participants were informed that a specific African American held more conservative values, liberal participants expressed decreased liking for this person whereas conservative participants expressed increased liking for this person (Chambers et al., 2013). Similarly, liberals and conservatives present themselves differently in how they decorate their bedrooms and office spaces (Carney et al., 2008). This difference in how they present themselves permits outside observers to make surprisingly

accurate judgments of the ideologies of people who occupy these spaces (Carney et al., 2008). Therefore, people may infer ideological similarity from various physical characteristics including race and subtle self-presentation preferences.

The ideological values of people in different communities may also be conveyed in other ways, too. During election season, ideological messages are pervasive and difficult to avoid. Bumper stickers and yard signs are popular ways for people to convey their own personal values. And, communities' values may even be inferred from more subtle cues (Motyl, Iyer, & Trawalter, 2013). For example, the ratio of bookstores to gun stores is a predictor of a community's voting behavior (Bishop, 2009). Specifically, communities with more bookstores relative to gun stores tend to vote in favor of the more liberal Democratic Party's candidates. Conservatives might perceive that they do not belong in communities with characteristics that convey that the dominant values there are liberal. Similarly, Christians might feel like they do not fit in communities where there are non-Christian religious symbols, and non-Christians might feel they do not fit in communities where there are many Christian religious symbols. Indeed, Christians expressed an increased sense of belonging in the presence of Christmas decorations, while non-Christians expressed a decreased sense of belonging in the presence of Christmas decorations (Schmitt, Davies, Hung, & Wright, 2010). Therefore, these symbols appear to communicate to individuals whether their ideological values are fit or misfit with the values held by their communities.

This sense of ideological misfit has many negative consequences. At the community level, ideological misfit correlates with reduced cooperation, civic and political participation, and trust (Putnam, 2000). Communities with more ideological and moral diversity that lack sufficient social integration exhibit heightened suicide rates, poorer health, and reduced satisfaction with life (Durkheim, 1897; Lenzi, Colucci, & Minas, 2012; Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter, & Nosek, 2013). In one sociological examination of this following the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election, Classen and Dunn (2010) found that conservatives who lived in liberal communities that voted for President Barack Obama had higher suicide rates than conservatives who lived in conservative communities that voted for Senator John McCain. Conservatives living in liberal communities likely experienced some degree of ideological misfit, and this may have contributed to their elevated suicide rate. Fortunately, suicide is relatively rare and is not the typical response to feeling like one does not fit in. Furthermore, these community-level data are correlational and cannot demonstrate the causal effects of misfit on various health-related outcomes. Psychological experiments, though, suggest that misfit does seem to have bleak causal effects on important outcomes. For example, individuals who do not fit in their communities tend to perform worse in their educational and occupational settings (Cheryan et al., 2009; Walton & Cohen, 2011), perceive heightened levels of threat (Purdie-Vaughns, Steele, Davies, Ditlmann, & Crosby, 2008), reduce political participation (Anderson, 2009; Putnam, 2000), and exhibit

reduced subjective and physical well-being (Lick, Tornello, Riskind, Schmidt, & Patterson, 2012; Sheldon & Bettencourt, 2010). For people who identify strongly with their preferred candidate, they show these negative effects in more pronounced ways (Young et al., 2009). Specifically, Americans who include their preferred candidate in their identity experienced electoral defeat as a personal rejection and reported less satisfaction of their basic psychological needs (including sense of belonging, esteem, belief in a meaningful existence, and sense of control). Together, these data convey the wide array of negative consequences being a misfit in one's community may have. Fortuitously, people may escape these negative consequences in a number of ways—one of the more extreme ways is to literally escape the ideologically misfitting community by migrating to a community where they fit better.

Migration

Migrating from one's home country to a foreign country is a dramatic action that is somewhat uncommon, but has grown more common in recent decades (Castles & Miller, 2009). Indeed, a recent report from the World Migration Organization (2010) forecasts that if the migration rate remains the same as it has for the past twenty years, the number of international migrants in an average year could reach 500 million people. The considerations that underlie decisions to migrate are certainly complex, but an analysis of myriad data sources seems to suggest some common factors (Greenwood, 1985; Oishi, 2010). One cultural and historical factor that predicts increased migration is industrialization (Massey, 2008). As countries become more industrialized, they tend to draw more migrants from less industrialized countries. Part of the appeal of more industrialized nations is that they tend to offer greater job opportunities for migrants, and these countries have more stable systems of government that provide some degree of security to their residents. Another common factor that drives international migration seems to be the prevailing moral, political, and religious values endorsed by the prospective migrants' home and possible future home country (Lee, 1966). Specifically, fear of persecution from a governing regime drives increased migration desires and the sense that another country who would welcome the migrants' values increases the likelihood of migrating to that country (Dorigo & Tobler, 1983). Numerous prospective migrants lack the means to actually migrate, but historical sociological analyses suggest that some migration is related to fear of persecution and the sense of being misfit in one's home country (Dorigo & Tobler, 1983; Lee, 1966). For example, early Americans chose to migrate to the newly founded United States in pursuit of freedom from religious persecution. Similarly, many Jewish people migrated to the United States as the Nazi Party gained power in pre-World War

II-era Germany (Holmes, 1995). These asylum-seeking migrants are not moving solely for economic gain, but also for a home where they feel like they belong and where they do not fear that they will be discriminated against on the basis of their identities.

In recent decades, the United States has witnessed many changes in its political landscape. For example, the Democratic and Republican parties have sorted into distinct camps that neatly align with liberal and conservative ideology (Levendusky, 2009). Today, the most conservative Democrat is more liberal than the most liberal Republican, and the most liberal Republican is more conservative than the most conservative Democrat. This sorting has led to less complex social identities, where people on the political right now only need to identify as "conservative" to convey that they likely vote for Republicans, attend evangelical Christian churches, oppose abortion rights and same-sex marriage, and have more authoritarian parenting styles (e.g., parental attitudes toward spanking correlate with state-level voting for George W. Bush at 77; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Jost, 2006; Koleva et al., 2012; Motyl et al., 2013). These less complex social identities are more vulnerable to threat and increase the likelihood of negative attitudes and prejudice toward outgroup members (Brewer & Pierce, 2005). Part of these negative attitudes include a lack of trust Americans have for people who belong to political parties different from their own and a tendency to view political outgroup members as "evil," "ignorant," and/or "senile" (Abramowitz, 2012; Jost, 2006; Kosloff, Greenberg, Schmader, Dechesne, & Weise, 2010; Pyszczynski, Henthorn, Motyl, & Gerow, 2010; Goldenberg, Heflick, Vaes, Motyl, & Greenberg, 2009). If members of the political outgroup are perceived in these negative terms, then it is not surprising that people view the election of the political outgroup to positions of great power as a threat and a reminder that their values just might not belong in a country led by someone deemed the "Anti-Christ," a "socialist," or a "Kenyan-born illegitimate president" (Pyszczynski et al., 2010; Wright, 2011).

Hypotheses

Thus, I hypothesize that people who vote for the losing candidate will threaten to migrate from the United States more than people who vote for the winning candidate. This relationship between voting for the losing candidate and migration threats will be mediated by the sense of belonging people feel in the United States following the election. Specifically, I hypothesize that supporters of Governor Romney will express more threats to migrate than supporters of President Obama, and that expressions of threats to migrate will be driven, in part, by their sense that they no longer belong in the United States.

<div align="center">**Method**</div>

Participants

Four hundred and fifty participants (293 men, 157 women) were recruited between November 7, 2012 and December 21, 2012 using Amazon's Mechanical Turk service. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 64 ($M = 28.14$, $SD = 9.83$). Of these participants, 308 voted for President Obama and 142 voted for Governor Romney. Participants were compensated $0.25 for their responses.

Materials and Procedure

Upon selecting to participate in a study of "Attitudes" on Mechanical Turk, participants were asked to provide demographic information, which included a question asking them to indicate who they voted for. Then, participants were randomly assigned to read one of two prompts designed to manipulate ideological fit. One of these prompts stated that the 2012 Presidential election and local election results indicate that the United States is becoming more liberal ("In the 2012 U.S. election, President Barack Obama won the popular vote and many states voted for liberal causes. For example, a number of states voted to permit same-sex marriage and other states voted to allow recreational use of marijuana"). The other prompt stated that despite President Obama's re-election, many local elections indicate that the United States is becoming more conservative ("In the 2012 U.S. election, President Barack Obama may have narrowly won the popular vote, but many states also voted against liberal causes. For example, a number of states voted to remove affirmative action programs that prevent discrimination in hiring. Other states voted to ban same-sex marriage and to ban the medicinal use of marijuana"). Upon reading the short prompt, participants were asked the open-ended question, "How does this make you feel about America?" After spending at least 30 seconds writing, participants completed a questionnaire.

This questionnaire included three 6-point Likert-type items ($\alpha = .74$; $1 = $ *Strongly Disagree*, $6 = $ *Strongly Agree*) assessing the endorsement of migration threat from the United States following the 2012 Presidential election ("The 2012 Presidential election makes me want to leave America," "I would like to live in another country," and "I would like to live somewhere else."). This questionnaire also included three 6-point Likert-type items ($\alpha = .79$; $1 = $ *Strongly Disagree*, $6 = $ *Strongly Agree*) assessing sense of belonging in America ("I don't feel like I belong in America anymore," "I generally feel like I belong in my community," and "I feel at home in my community.").

Table 1. Endorsement of Migration Threats Descriptive Statistics

	Obama voters		Romney voters		Overall	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
United States becoming more liberal	1.47	0.81	2.92	1.34	1.91	1.19
United States becoming more conservative	1.49	0.72	2.7	1.26	1.89	1.09
Overall	1.48	0.76	2.81	1.29	1.90	1.14

Table 2. Sense of Belonging Descriptive Statistics

	Obama voters		Romney voters		Overall	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
United States becoming more liberal	3.95	1.17	3.23	1.37	3.75	1.30
United States becoming more conservative	3.92	1.19	3.28	1.46	3.69	1.29
Overall	3.94	1.18	3.25	1.41	3.72	1.29

Results

Romney Supporters Expressed Greater Migration Desire than Obama Supporters Following 2012 Presidential Election

The first hypothesis was examined using a 2 (Voting Behavior: Obama vs. Romney) × 2 (Prime: United States Becoming More Liberal vs. More Conservative) ANOVA with migration threats as the dependent variable. This analysis shows that Romney voters endorsed migration threats significantly more than did Obama voters, $F(1, 446) = 182.95, p < .001, \eta^2 = .29$. There was no main effect of prime or interaction effect between vote and prime ($Fs < 1.35, ps > .24$). For descriptive statistics, see Table 1.

Romney Supporters Reported Reduced Sense of Belonging Compared to Obama Supporters Following 2012 Presidential Election

The second hypothesis was examined using a 2 (Voting Behavior: Obama vs. Romney) × 2 (Prime: United States Becoming More Liberal vs. More Conservative) ANOVA with sense of belonging as the dependent variable. This analysis shows Romney voters reported feeling significantly less of a sense of belonging than Obama voters, $F(1, 446) = 28.15, p < .001, \eta^2 = .06$. There was no main effect of prime or interaction effect between vote and prime ($Fs < 1.01, ps > .70$). For descriptive statistics, see Table 2.

Fig. 1. Sense of belonging mediates the relationship between vote choice and migration expressions (vote choice: 0 = Obama, 1 = Romney).

Sense of Belonging Mediates the Relationship Between Vote and Migration Desires

To test whether sense of belonging mediated the relationship between vote and migration threat, I conducted a mediation analysis following Baron and Kenny's (1986) recommendations (see also Judd & Kenny, 2010). First, a regression analysis confirmed that vote (Obama = 0, Romney = 1) predicted sense of belonging scores, *unstandardized b* = –0.68, *SE* = 0.12, *t* = –5.31, *p* < .001. Another regression confirmed that vote predicted migration threats, *unstandardized b* = 1.32, *SE* = 0.09, *t* = 13.50, *p* < .001. Next, a regression revealed that sense of belonging predicts migration threats, *unstandardized b* = –0.55, *SE* = 0.04, *t* = –11.59, *p* < .001. Finally, a hierarchical regression in which sense of belonging (the mediator) was entered into the first step and vote was entered into the second step. This analysis demonstrates that the direct relationship between vote and migration threats was no longer significant once the relationship between sense of belonging and migration desires was removed, all *ps* > .23. Sobel's test for mediation supported this mediation process, *Sobel's z* = –5.10, *p* < .001.[1] These findings suggest that sense of belonging mediates the relationship between vote and migration threats (Figure 1).

Discussion

I theorized that one of the reasons that voters may threaten to move to another country following the election of a President who they do not support is that they perceive that their country does not share their ideological values and this makes people feel like they do not belong. In the current study, I found preliminary evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Specifically, people who voted for Governor

---

[1] The reverse mediation model does not meet the requirements of a mediational process. Specifically, the relationship between vote and belonging persists even when including migration expressions as a predictor.

Romney reported a reduced sense of belonging and expressed increased threats to migrate to another country compared to people who voted for President Obama. Furthermore, the relationship between vote and threats to migrate was mediated by sense of (not) belonging.

These findings are consistent with the ideological migration hypothesis that people may sometimes selectively migrate in ways that improve the fit between their personal political values and their community's political values (Motyl et al., 2013). The current study extends past work on ideological migration by looking at individuals' reactions to a real election and how that might lead individuals to at least threaten to migrate, and possibly foster migration not just from one community to another, but from the United States to another country. As the data are limited to expressing threats to migrate, and do not look at *actual* migration behavior, it remains unclear whether the election of an ideologically undesirable candidate would motivate people to actually migrate to another. These data do, however, provide evidence suggesting that people's perception that their values do not fit in America following an undesirable election outcome may motivate them to at least threaten to migrate from America.

Threatening to migrate following undesirable electoral outcomes suggests a certain lack of faith in the democratic institutions' ability to represent the interests of the voting public. If people perceive that their representatives do not adequately represent them or that their legislative bodies are incapable to pass important legislation, then voters may feel that their options are limited (Abramowitz, 2012). Some people respond to undesirable electoral outcomes with uncivil actions ranging from fighting in town hall meetings to carrying a gun and a sign that read, "It is time to water the tree of liberty [with the blood of patriots and tyrants]" to one of President Obama's speeches in New Hampshire ("When Protesters Bear Arms Against Health-care Reform," 2009). People choosing this uncivil option perceive that an important part of their identity is under attack and are acting with hostility in hopes of defending their notion of what America is. Indeed, threats to sacred values often lead to a sense of moral outrage and enflame intergroup incivility (Schimel, Hayes, Williams, & Jahrig, 2007; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Lerner, & Green, 2000; Vail et al., 2009; Motyl et al., 2009; Motyl et al., 2011, Motyl & Pyszczynski, 2010, Pyszczynski et al., 2009, Vail et al., 2012). The current data, though, suggest that people may not simply become more hostile or uncivil in their daily interactions, but rather that some people may simply choose to avoid the incivility and the reminder that the candidate who better shares their values lost. Alternately, it is possible that threats of migration are one manifestation of general frustration following an electoral loss. If this latter possibility is true, it may explain the seemingly contradictory findings that electoral losses incite intergroup incivility and migrating away from the incivility. The current data do not differentiate between these possibilities.

Limitations and Future Directions

The sample used in the present study was not nationally representative, so it is possible that these effects may hold for some groups of Americans, but not all. This concern, though, is mitigated by the use of Amazon's Mechanical Turk service which generates samples of participants that are more diverse than standard psychology studies of college sophomores (Gosling, Sandy, John, & Potter, 2010). Moreover, the findings provide an explanation for the threats made by many Americans following the election of a candidate they do not want in office.

The current study examined the expression of threats of migration and the feeling of belonging following a single election in which the more liberal candidate won. The data show that Governor Romney voters expressed more threats to migrate and a reduced sense of belonging than President Obama voters expressed. Given that the data come from a single election, it is possible that the conservative base who supported Governor Romney have lower levels of belonging and want to migrate more than does the liberal base who supported President Obama. However, conservatives tend to be lower in openness to experience, less interested in international travel, and have greater social capital than liberals, so this possibility seems unlikely (Carney et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2003; Motyl, Iyer, Trawalter, & Haidt, 2012). The data could also be interpreted to mean that Obama voters are not as concerned with ideological fit as Romney voters are, but this seems unlikely considering the oft-publicized claims from liberals that they were going to move to Canada following each of George W. Bush's elections. Furthermore, liberals and conservatives alike seem to express a desire to migrate, which is related to actual selective migration, to ideologically fitting communities in past research (e.g., Bishop, 2008; Motyl et al., 2013). Thus, the more likely explanation here may be that Obama voters could not conceive of how the re-election of Obama and the legalization of recreational marijuana in two states would be an indicator of the United States becoming more conservative (Ferner, 2012). The fact that Romney voters showed the predicted effects suggests that the ideological fit manipulation was perhaps more believable for them.

This study also focuses on migration *threats*, and not migration *behavior*. Insufficient data exist to test potential quadrennial spikes in ideologically motivated international migration, but the likelihood of many people actually moving in response to the election of a Democrat or a Republican in the United States is rather low. David Cohen, a Montreal-based immigration lawyer, recalls that following George W. Bush's election he received many calls from unhappy Democrats and stated that, "When they speak on the phone, they're adamant. They feel very, very strong about it. This government doesn't speak for me is the language that we often hear" ("Where Obama, and America, go from here," 2012). He noted that very few people actually do move to Canada following ideologically objectionable

elections. Michael Niren, an attorney who specializes in Canadian/United States immigration, further states that, "some people actually act on their 'threats' of moving north of the border" (Radia, 2012). Further complicating American migration to Canada is the fact that Canada is a more socially liberal country than the United States, which should make it a more appealing place for American liberals but not American conservatives. The generally low level of political knowledge among voters in the United States may make this concern less important, as many Americans might not know that Canada's values do not fit their own—just that Canada did not just elect a president that they do not like (Delli-Carpini & Keeter, 1993; but see also Prior & Lupia, 2008). Past research specifically demonstrates that people express a greater desire to transfer from their university, if its ideology is becoming more incongruent (Motyl et al., 2013). Presumably the converse may also be true. If voters learned that the country they are contemplating migrating to holds values incongruent with their own, their desire to migrate to that country would likely be dampened.

Conclusion

Why do partisans threaten to move to Canada if their preferred candidate loses the Presidential election? The present study offers a possible answer: the election may signal that their country holds ideological values at odds with the values held by the supporters of the losing candidate. This perceived ideological misfit threatens the basic human need to belong to a valued social group and fosters a sense that one does not belong. Perhaps in an attempt to rectify this, people may threaten, or even wish, to migrate from the United States in protest of the changing values signaled by an election.

References

Anderson, M. R. (2009). Beyond membership: A sense of community and political behavior. *Political Behavior*, *31*(4), 603–627.

Abramowitz, A. I. (2012). *The polarized public? Why American government is so dysfunctional*. Boston, MA: Pearson Education.

Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *51*, 1173–1182.

Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, *117*, 497–529.

Bishop, B. (2008). *The big sort: Why the clustering of like-minded America is tearing us apart*. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin Harcourt.

Bishop, B. (2009). The big sort: Why the clustering of like-minded America is tearing us apart. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Brewer, M. B., & Pierce, K. P. (2005). Social identity complexity and outgroup tolerance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *31*(3), 428–437.

Byrne, D. E. (1971). *The attraction paradigm*. New York, NY: Academic Press.

Carney, D. R., Jost, J. T., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2008). The secret lives of liberals and conservatives: Personality profiles, interaction styles, and the things they leave behind. *Political Psychology*, *29*(6), 807–840.

Carpini, M. X. D., & Keeter, S. (1996). What Americans know about politics and why it matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Castles, S., & Miller, M. J. (2009). *The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chambers, J. R., Schlenker, B. R., & Collisson, B. (2013). Ideology and Prejudice The Role of Value Conflicts. *Psychological science*, *24*(2), 140–149.

Cheryan, S., Plaut, V. C., Davies, P. G., & Steele, C. M. (2009). Ambient belonging: how stereotypical cues impact gender participation in computer science. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *97*(6), 1045.

Classen, T. J., & Dunn, R. A. (2010). The politics of hope and despair: The effect of presidential election outcomes on suicide rates. *Social Science Quarterly*, *91*, 593–612.

Delli-Carpini, M. X., & Keeter, S. (1993). Measuring political knowledge: Putting first things first. *American Journal of Political Science*, 1179–1206.

Dorigo, G., & Tobler, W. (1983). Push-Pull Migration Laws. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *73*(1), 1–17.

Durkheim, E. (1897). *Suicide: A study in sociology*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.

Ferner, M. (2012). Marijuana for recreational use now legal in Colorado. Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/10/hickenlooper-signs-amendm_n_2272168.html.

Goldenberg, J. L., Heflick, N. A., Vaes, J., Motyl, M., & Greenberg, J. (2009). Of mice and men, and objectified women: Terror management as an explanatory framework for infrahumanization effects. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *12*, 1–14.

Gosling, S. D., Sandy, C. J., John, O. P., & Potter, J. (2010). Wired but not WEIRD: The promise of the Internet in reaching more diverse samples. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *33*, 94–95.

Greenwood, M. J. (1985). Human migration: Theory, models, and empirical studies. *Journal of Regional Science*, *25*, 521–544.

Haidt, J., Rosenberg, E., & Hom, H. (2003). Differentiating diversities: Moral diversity is not like other kinds1. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *33*(1), 1–36.

Hetherington, M. J., & Weiler, J. D. (2009). *Authoritarianism and polarization in American politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Holmes, C. (1995). Jewish economic and refugee migrations, 1880–1950. In R. Cohen (Ed.), *The Cambridge survey of world migration* (pp. 148–52). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. *American Psychologist*, *61*, 651–670.

Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, *129*, 339–375.

Judd, C. M., & Kenny, D. A. (2010). Data analysis in social psychology: Recent and recurring issues. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Koleva, S. P., Graham, J., Ditto, P., Iyer, R., & Haidt, J. (2012). Tracing the threads: how five moral concerns (especially Purity) help explain culture war attitudes. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *46*, 184–194.

Kosloff, S., Greenberg, J., Schmader, T., Dechesne, M., & Weise, D. (2010). Smearing the opposition: Implicit and explicit stigmatization of the 2008 US Presidential candidates and the current US President. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *139*(3), 383.

Leary, M. R. (2009). Affiliation, acceptance, and belonging: The pursuit of interpersonal connection. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.). (2010), *Handbook of social psychology* (Vol. 2, 4th ed.). Wiley.com.

Lee, E. (1966). A theory of migration. *Demography*, *3*, 47–57.

Lenzi, M., Colucci, E., & Minas, H. (2012). Suicide, Culture, and Society from a Cross-National Perspective. *Cross-Cultural Research*, *46*(1), 50–71.

Lick, D. J., Tornello, S. L., Riskind, R. G., Schmidt, K. M., & Patterson, C. J. (2012). Social climate for sexual minorities predicts well-being among heterosexual offspring of lesbian and gay parents. *Sexuality Research and Social Policy*, *9*(2), 99–112.

Levendusky, M. (2009). *The partisan sort: How liberals became Democrats and conservatives became Republicans*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Massey, D. S. (2009). Globalization and inequality: Explaining American exceptionalism. *European Sociological Review*, *25*(1), 9–23.

McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *27*, 415–444.

Motyl, M., Hart, J., Pyszczynski, T., Weise, D., Cox, C., Maxfield, M., & Siedel, A. (2011). Subtle priming of shared human experiences eliminates threat-induced negativity toward Arabs, immigrants, and peace-making. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *47*, 1179–1184.

Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Oishi, S., Trawalter, S., & Nosek, B. A. (2013). How ideological migration geographically segregates and polarizes groups. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, In press.

Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Trawalter, S., & Haidt, J. (2012). Judging the moral ambience by physical cues in an environment. Unpublished manuscript.

Motyl, M., & Pyszczynski, T. (2010). The existential underpinnings of the cycle of terrorist and counterterrorist violence and pathways to peaceful resolutions. *International Journal of Social Psychology*, *22*, 267–291.

Motyl, M., Vail III, K. E., & Pyszczynski, T. (2009). Waging terror: Psychological motivations in cultural violence and peacemaking. In M. Morgan and P. Zimbardo (Eds), *The day that changed everything: The impact of 9/11* (pp. 23–36). Boston, MA: Praeger/Greenwood Press.

Motyl, M., Iyer, R., & Trawalter, S. (2013). How people discern the values of communities via ambient moral cues. Unpublished manuscript.

Murphy, M. C., Steele, C. M., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Signaling threat how situational cues affect women in math, science, and engineering settings. *Psychological Science*, *18*(10), 879–885.

Oishi, S. (2010). The psychology of residential mobility: Implications for the self, social relationships, and well-being. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *5*, 5–21.

Oyserman, D., Brickman, D., Bybee, D., & Celious, A. (2006). Fitting in matters markers of in-group belonging and academic outcomes. *Psychological Science*, *17*(10), 854–861.

Prior, M., & Lupia, A. (2008). Money, time, and political knowledge: Distinguishing quick recall and political learning skills. *American Journal of Political Science*, *52*, 168–182.

Purdie-Vaughns, V., Steele, C. M., Davies, P. G., Ditlmann, R., & Crosby, J. R. (2008). Social identity contingencies: how diversity cues signal threat or safety for African Americans in mainstream institutions. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *94*(4), 615.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Pyszczynski, T., Henthorn, C., Motyl, M., & Gerow, K. (2010). Is Obama the anti-Christ? Racial priming, extreme criticisms of Barack Obama, and attitudes toward the 2008 US presidential candidates. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *46*(5), 863–866.

Pyszczynski, T., Motyl, M., & Abdollahi, A. (2009). Righteous violence: Killing for god, country, freedom, and justice. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, *1*, 12–39.

Radia, A. (2012). Disgruntled Americans threaten to move to Canada after Obama victory. Canada politics. Retrieved from http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/canada-politics/disgruntled-americans-threaten-move-canada-obama-victory-062354107.html

Rosenbaum, M. E. (1986). The repulsion hypothesis: On the nondevelopment of relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *51*, 1156.

Schimel, J., Hayes, J., Williams, T., & Jahrig, J. (2007). Is death really the worm at the core? Converging evidence that worldview threat increases death-thought accessibility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *92*, 789–803.

Schmitt, M. T., Davies, K., Hung, M., & Wright, S. C. (2010). Identity moderates the effects of Christmas displays on mood, self-esteem, and inclusion. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *46*, 1017–1022.

Sheldon, K. M., & Bettencourt, B. (2002). Psychological need-satisfaction and subjective well-being within social groups. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *41*(1), 25–38.

Tetlock, P. E., Kristel, O. V., Elson, S. B., Green, M. C., & Lerner, J. S. (2000). The psychology of the unthinkable: taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *78*(5), 853.

Vail, K. E., Arndt, J., Motyl, M., & Pyszczynski, T. (2012). The aftermath of destruction: Images of destroyed buildings increase support for war, dogmatism, and death thought accessibility. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *48*, 1069–1081.

Walton, G. M., & Cohen, G. L. (2011). A brief social-belonging intervention improves academic and health outcomes of minority students. *Science*, *331*(6023), 1447–1451.

"When Protesters Bear Arms Against Health-care Reform." (2009). Time Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1917356,00.html.

"Where Obama, and America, go from here." (2012). CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/opinion/opinion-roundup-election-result/index.html.

Wright, J. (2011). *The Obama haters: Behind the right-wing campaign of lies, innuendo & racism*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc.

Young, S. G., Bernstein, M. J., & Claypool, H. M. (2009). Rejected by the nation: The electoral defeat of candidates included in the self is experienced as personal rejection. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, *9*(1), 315–326.

MATT MOTYL is a doctoral candidate in social psychology at the University of Virginia. His research focuses on how people become so divided over concerns of morality, politics, and religion. He finds that existential motives to affiliate with others who reinforce people's ideological beliefs drive people to selectively migrate to communities that reinforce their ideological beliefs and away from communities that threaten their ideological beliefs. This tendency leads to the gradual construction segregated ideological, moral enclaves. His current research applies this theoretical framework to understanding the culture wars in the United States.